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The events of March 2011 at the nuclear power complex in
Fukushima, Japan, raised questions about the safe operation of
nuclear power plants, with early retirement of existing nuclear
power plants being debated in the policy arena and considered by
regulators. Also, the future of building new nuclear power plants
is highly uncertain. Should nuclear power policies become more
restrictive, one potential option for climate change mitigation will
be less available. However, a systematic analysis of nuclear power
policies, including early retirement, has been missing in the climate
change mitigation literature. We apply an energy economy model
framework to derive scenarios and analyze the interactions and
tradeoffs between these two policy fields. Our results indicate that
early retirement of nuclear power plants leads to discounted cu-
mulative global GDP losses of 0.07% by 2020. If, in addition, new
nuclear investments are excluded, total losses will double. The effect
of climate policies imposed by an intertemporal carbon budget on
incremental costs of policies restricting nuclear power use is small.
However, climate policies have much larger impacts than policies
restricting the use of nuclear power. The carbon budget leads to
cumulative discounted near term reductions of global GDP of 0.64%
until 2020. Intertemporal flexibility of the carbon budget approach
enables higher near-term emissions as a result of increased power
generation from natural gas to fill the emerging gap in electricity
supply, while still remaining within the overall carbon budget.
Demand reductions and efficiency improvements are the second
major response strategy.
climate policy | energy economy model | mitigation scenarios |
nuclear policy
The dramatic events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear com-plex triggered after the combined earthquake/tsunami event
on March 11, 2011, revived the debate about the future of nu-
clear power generation. The Fukushima event put safety issues
of civilian use of nuclear power back on the policy agenda, along
with problems and risks of treating waste, proliferation, eco-
nomic performance, and resource availability.
Because nuclear power results in no direct CO2 emissions,
some see it to be a promising technology option for climate
change mitigation. Nuclear power is also promoted as a technol-
ogy with low emissions of other air pollutants such as sulfur and
nitrogen oxides (1–4). Even in the absence of climate policies,
the Nuclear Energy Agency “Red Book” (5) expects worldwide
nuclear power capacity to increase by 37% to 110%, and the In-
ternational Energy Agency (6) expects a 79% increase by 2035 in
global nuclear electricity generation in their New Policies Sce-
nario [and an increase of 136% for the “450-ppm Scenario” (6)].
The US Energy Information Administration expects global elec-
tricity from nuclear power plants to increase only 39% by 2030
without climate change mitigation policies (7).
The 22nd round of the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (8)
published scenarios from a large number of integrated assessment
models on development of the global energy sector over the 21st
century for a reference case, as well as for greenhouse gas stabi-
lization scenarios to 550 and 450 ppm of CO2 equivalent con-
centration. In the reference scenarios, nuclear power generation
increases 34% to 180% by 2035. In the stabilization scenarios, all
models show heavier deployment of nuclear power than in the
reference scenario. Two other model comparison exercises fo-
cused, among other things, on the economic value of future
nuclear power expansion for addressing climate change stabili-
zation (9, 10). For different sets of models, both compared
limited deployment of nuclear power in a strong long-term sta-
bilization scenario vs. the case of full flexibility in nuclear power
expansion and found a relatively small increase in mitigation
costs. Remme and Blesl (11) and Vaillancourt et al. (12) present
additional scenario studies on nuclear power.
Currently, however, the future of nuclear power has become
much more uncertain, as national policy makers are reviewing
their nuclear programs (13). Whereas the United States and
France have continued to express confidence in their own nu-
clear plans, and Saudi Arabia and Poland announced plans to
start a nuclear power industry, China, India, and Japan have
announced a thorough review of their plans. A public vote in
Italy reconfirmed an earlier decision to refrain from nuclear
power. Switzerland’s governing federal council decided to phase
out nuclear power; existing plants may continue operation sub-
ject to safety constraints. The German parliament voted for an
accelerated decommissioning of existing plants and also to pre-
clude the addition of any new capacity. Moreover, as of spring
2012, all Japanese nuclear power capacity is out of operation,
and local policy makers announced that safety concerns may
prevent many plants from ever restarting.
Policy debates about the future of nuclear power and climate
change mitigation touch on the issues of existing and new nuclear
power plants as well as the impact on CO2 emissions and long-
term climate change stabilization. The existing literature on the
economics of climate change mitigation covers only some of the
different dimensions of the nuclear power policy space. It focuses
on the role of nuclear power in a carbon-constrained world
and on constraints to future capacity extensions. The issue of
decommissioning existing plants as an additional dimension of the
policy space has thus far not been addressed. The present study
aims at closing this gap by providing a systematic tradeoff analysis
that covers the fundamental dimensions of climate and nuclear
power policies. We address three questions. First, what are the
economic implications of decommissioning existing nuclear
power plants? Second, what are the additional consequences of
combining decommissioning with restrictions on future invest-
ments in new nuclear generating capacity and long-term emis-
sions caps? Finally, what are robust energy sector strategies to fill
the electricity generation gap caused by decommissioning?
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Dimensions of Nuclear Power and Climate Policies
In this section, we introduce the nuclear power scenarios and the
climate policy used in the analysis. We divide the former into
four different cases, differentiating between two main dimen-
sions of nuclear power policies: (i) the treatment of existing
capacities and (ii) investments into new capacities.
Nuclear policies may result in the switch-off of existing
capacities for safety reasons or because of economic barriers set
by high standards for refurbishment. Building of new capacity
might be hindered by outright bans or by requiring safety stand-
ards that increase investments costs. We distinguish four nuclear
policy scenarios as follows:
Renaissance. Existing plants are used until the end of their life-
time, and refurbishment could extend the lifetime. In addition,
nuclear power capacities are expanded. The implicit assumption
underlying this policy package is that nuclear power is safe, as
commonly assumed in global assessments and projections.
Phase Out. In a phase-out scenario, existing plants operate until
the end of their lifetime, but no new capacity is installed. In
this scenario, the property rights of operators of existing plants
are respected, but the confidence in safety improvements in
new reactor designs is assumed to be insufficient for allowing
capacity extensions.
New Start. In a new-start scenario, existing plants are decom-
missioned, but investments in new capacity are possible. This
scenario assumes that old plants are considered unsafe, while
policymakers are confident about the technological progress
embodied in new reactor designs. The implicit assumption is that
the technology option for the future is valued higher than the
existing operational rights that are subject to safety risks.
Full Exit. In a full-exit scenario, existing plants are decommis-
sioned and no additional investments will take place. This scenario
puts an immediate end to nuclear power, reflecting a skeptical
position regarding safety or public acceptability.
The decommissioning dimension is analyzed by varying gradu-
ally the constraint on the operation of existing nuclear power ca-
pacity to shed light into this largely unexplored policy dimension.
The dimension of building new plants is analyzed by either allowing
investments in new nuclear power plants or restricting them to
zero. SI Appendix, Fig. S9, contains a sensitivity analysis in which
we gradually increase the investment costs of nuclear power plants.
Climate policies in the present framework are implemented
via an intertemporal global budget on energy sector CO2 emissions
(14, 15). The budget applied in the present study limits the
cumulative CO2 emissions from the global energy sector to 300
GtC for the period of 2005 to 2100, representing a relatively
aggressive climate mitigation policy consistent with the long-term
target of limiting global warming to 2 °C.
Techno-Economics of Nuclear Power
Existing Capacities. Fig. 1 depicts the vintage structure of nuclear
power generation capacity in operation in early 2011. The oldest
plants are 45 y old, and the 5-y period with the highest installation
rate was 1982 to 1987, reaching nearly 120 GW. Vintages put in
place before 1992 are mostly located in Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Only
during the 1990s did other countries start to adopt nuclear power
at a notable scale. Nuclear power plants currently planned or
under construction are mainly in non-OECD countries.
Investment Costs. Capital costs make up a large share of total
nuclear electricity generation costs, and additional safety meas-
ures tend to increase these costs. Investment costs also change
over time depending on economic, technical, and political con-
ditions, with estimates in the past 10 y tending sharply upward.
Most recent estimates for overnight construction costs are in the
range of $3,000 to $6,000/kW (2, 16, 17), with somewhat lower
costs in non-OECD countries (IEA 2010; ref. 16). Koomey and
Hultman (18) found a highly skewed distribution function for
observed investment costs in the United States, with median costs
of $2,200/kW and a 90% quantile of $8,200/kW (typically plants
with long construction times). Grubler et al. (19) and Lako et al.
(20) analyze changing investment costs and find a negative
learning effect. A study of existing nuclear power plants in Ger-
many (21) that were being considered for technical lifetime
extensions beyond 35 y estimated costs for refurbishment between
$35 and $110/kW and reactor year.
The present study assumes overnight investment costs for
a light water reactor of $3,000/kW, which is at the low end of the
ranges given earlier, but based on the expectation of capacity
growth mainly in non-OECD countries. The technical lifetime of
nuclear power plants is set at 60 y. After 40 y, additional re-
furbishment costs of $100/kW and reactor year are required. The
costs of regular decommissioning are included in the operation
and maintenance costs.
Uranium Resources. Conventional identified resources of uranium
are differentiated into recovery cost categories. The assessment
by the Nuclear Energy Agency (5) comprises 6.3 Mt of uranium,
which equals approximately 100 times the current reactor require-
ments. The estimates of the World Energy Council (22) and
GermanGeological Survey (23) mainly rely on the numbers of the
Fig. 1. Vintages of existing nuclear power installed
in the past and capacities under construction and
planned. The figure does not contain plants decom-
missioned before 2011, but does include plants shut
down after March 2011. The figure does not ac-
count for recent revisions of expansion plans. “Rest
of world” includes Canada, South Africa, Switzer-
land, Ukraine, and Turkey. “Other Asia” includes
Taiwan and South Korea. Source: International
Atomic Energy Agency Power Reactor Information
System database (http://www.iaea.org/pris/).
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Nuclear Energy Agency but apply different interpretations for
identified uranium resources. The more uncertain category of
conventional undiscovered uranium resources are also assessed
differently by the three institutions. For the present study, the
assumption is that 23 MtU are ultimately available with increasing
extraction costs. Moreover, we account for nuclear fuel derived
from dismantling military devices. It is assumed that the United
States receives 22 kilotons uranium per annum at zero cost until
2015 (5). Reprocessing and fast-breeding reactors are not consid-
ered here. Given the optimistic assessment of uranium resources,
this assumption is economically reasonable in the near term (24).
Results
Nuclear Renaissance Without Carbon Budget. As a baseline, we use
the scenario of a nuclear renaissance without imposition of the
intertemporal carbon budget, as this represents the least inter-
vention of public policy in the energy market. The policy sce-
narios will be compared with this baseline. SI Appendix contains
more information.
Over the 21st century, total primary energy consumption
grows by approximately 133%, from 513 EJ in 2010. Fossil fuels
will dominate the global energy sector until 2050. The electricity
sector grows by 258% from 2010 to 2050. For electricity genera-
tion, gas and coal are increasing, as shown in Fig. 2A. Oil is mainly
used to fuel the growing demand for transportation fuels. After
midcentury, the energy mix—especially for electricity generation—
becomes more diversified. Coal and gas fade out of the electricity
mix (52% in 2100) as carbon-free technologies gain share. How-
ever, total coal use will continue to grow as a source for liquid trans-
portation fuels that substitute for oil supplies peaking as a result of
resource constraints. The reliance on fossil fuels increases CO2
emissions from 8 GtC in 2005 to 21 GtC in 2100.
In the reference case, global nuclear power generation remains
approximately constant until 2050 (Fig. 2A). The constant ag-
gregate, however, contains a global shift of nuclear power gen-
eration from OECD countries toward Asian countries. These
countries increase deployment considerably in the second half of
the 21st century, which leads to the total growth. In the reference
scenario, nuclear power will achieve the highest share in the
power mix at 17.2% in 2075. In this year, nuclear power peaks as
a result of the resource constraint on uranium use.
Nuclear Phase-Out and Carbon Budget. The imposition of a carbon
budget and the phase-out of nuclear power production are
considered as severe policy interventions. The imposition of the
carbon budget puts a price on carbon emissions and thereby
decreases use of fossil fuels compared with the no-policy case in
2020: coal by 40%, gas by 18%, and oil by 13% (SI Appendix, Fig.
S5). The electricity generation mix for the nuclear renaissance
case with carbon budget is shown in Fig. 2B. A major shift in
electricity generation caused by climate policies is the addition of
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) to natural gas power
plants. The net shortfalls in gas and coal power generation in
2020 are 3,000 TWh and 5,300 TWh compared with the no-
policy case, respectively. This shortfall of fossil-fueled electricity
supply is partially compensated (3,300 TWh) by low-carbon
technologies, of which nuclear power accounts for 540 TWh. The
remainder is provided by hydropower, bioenergy with CCS, wind,
and geothermal power. Solar electricity production does not play
a significant role in the short run.
The phase-out of nuclear power does not change these figures
until 2020 independent of the imposition of stringent climate
policies. Only in the following years is the generation of nuclear
power significantly higher in the case with carbon budget and a
nuclear renaissance. The impact of nuclear phase-out on fossil
fuel use is therefore also very small in the near-term.
Wind deployment is an important option to supply low-carbon
electricity in the near term, but phasing out of nuclear power
does not give an additional boost to wind power deployment
because the high growth rates already become costly as result of
integration and adjustment costs. In the longer term (after 2040),
fossil fuel generation is substituted by heavy deployment of solar
energy sources to meet the carbon budget, but, in the short term,
solar technologies do not play a significant role in supplying
electricity. If, in addition, nuclear power is phased out, solar
power technologies become much more prominent after 2030.
One key consequence arising from the phase-out of nuclear
power is that CO2 emissions in the absence of a carbon budget
increase significantly, especially after 2025, and eventually reach
an additional 350 MtC/y in 2050. The effect is most significant in
Asian regions where most nuclear power plants are expected to
A B
Fig. 2. Global electricity generation mix for 2005
to 2050 for the nuclear renaissance cases without
(A) and with (B) with carbon budget imposed.
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Fig. 3. Differences of GDP 2010 to 2050 relative to the reference case without
carbon budget and nuclear renaissance.
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be built. On the contrary, if the carbon budget is imposed, there
is nearly no intertemporal reallocation of optimally using the
CO2 emissions budget over time.
The sensitivity of GDP in the three policy scenarios relative
to the no-policy case is shown in Fig. 3. If no carbon budget is
imposed, the nuclear phase-out has only a negligible effect. The
imposition of the carbon budget implies a growing GDP loss
that reaches 2.1% per year in 2050. The incremental costs of a
nuclear phase-out are higher in the case with climate policy.
The deviation starts in 2030 and reaches 0.2% in 2050. Hence, the
nuclear phase-out has little impact on the macroeconomy in the
near term. The imposition of the carbon budget, independent of
nuclear phase-out, makes a difference even in the near term.
Effect of Decommissioning Existing Nuclear Capacities. The nuclear
policy dimension of decommissioning existing nuclear power
plants is gradually added to each of the four scenarios. The ad-
ditional constraint is implemented by decommissioning certain
vintages starting in 2010 that were supposed to operate until the
end of the technical lifetime. The constraint is varied in strength
by decommissioning only the oldest vintage, then the second
oldest, and so on. In the strongest case, all existing capacities are
decommissioned, which implies that 2,730 TWh of nuclear power
generation would not be available after 2015.
Fig. 4 shows the differential effect of decommissioning on the
global electricity sector for the cases with and without carbon
budget and nuclear phase-out. All scenarios share three main
features. First, the shortfall of electricity is most sensitive for
varying the decommissioning of plants that entered operation
between 1978 and 1993. This reflects the specific structure of
the nuclear vintages presented in Fig. 1. Second, the shortfall of
electricity production is only partially compensated by new ca-
pacity, which implies significant demand reductions. Finally,
substitution with new capacity becomes more important as the
stringency of the decommissioning constraint is increased. Nat-
ural gas generally plays the most important role in filling the
emerging generation gap.
In addition to these three general observations, the two scenarios
that allow the addition of new nuclear power plants show signifi-
cant contributions in reducing the shortfall from decommissioning
Fig. 4. Differential impact of decommissioning on the global electricity sector measured by changes of cumulative electricity generation from 2010 to 2020.
The reference case is always without decommissioning. Upper: No carbon budget. Lower: Carbon budget imposed. Left: Scenarios in which investment in new
nuclear power plants are feasible. Right: Cases without investments in new nuclear capacity. Within each of the four graphs, the bottom stacked bar shows
the case of only the oldest vintage (i.e., everything built before 1973) being decommissioned. The next stacked bar above the bottom bar shows the result
when the second-oldest vintage was also decommissioned, and so forth, up to the top bar, which represents the case of full decommissioning. The sum of the
stacked bars represents the shortfall of cumulative electricity production over the period of 2010 to 2020. The components show how the shortfall is
compensated by alternative technologies, including demand reduction.
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old plants. Coal plays a notable role only in the absence of a carbon
budget, with a larger contribution if new nuclear power plants are
not allowed. If the carbon budget is implemented, the contribution
of coal is substituted by a mix of natural gas with CCS, hydropower,
and wind; coal with CCS is of only minor importance. Although
renewable sources are essential for producing carbon-free elec-
tricity in the longer term, their contribution in filling the gap caused
by decommissioning nuclear power plants is small. More details of
electricity generation mixes are given in SI Appendix, Fig. S6.
The increased use of fossil-fuel electricity generation implies
higher CO2 emissions as a result of nuclear power decommis-
sioning. If power sector CO2 emissions are not compensated by
reductions in other sectors, total emissions will increase. The
effect on CO2 emissions is shown in Fig. 5. The four cases show
an inverted U-shape that nearly vanishes by 2050. The new effect
of decommissioning is that it implies a temporal reallocation of
the optimal emission trajectory if the carbon budget is imposed,
with near-term CO2 emissions increasing by 100 MtC/y, which is
a rather small share of total power sector emissions. The re-
allocation of CO2 emissions in the two cases with carbon budget
are at maximum 2.2 GtC, which is less than 1% of the total
budget of 300 GtC until 2100. The effect on CO2 emissions is
more significant if the carbon budget is not imposed.
Fig. 6 shows the costs for various policy scenarios measured by
the net present value of GDP losses in relative terms compared
with the scenario without policies for the period of 2010 to 2020.
For scenarios without climate policy, the phase-out scenario leads
to costs of 0.006%, whereas the new-start scenario implies policy
costs of 0.07%. Combining the decommissioning and the invest-
ment abandoning leads to policy costs of 0.14%. This is nearly
twice the sum of the isolated policies. In case of decommissioning,
the refurbishment costs of old plants are no longer incurred.
If the carbon budget is imposed in a renaissance scenario, the
policy costs are 0.64%. These costs increase by 0.11% to 0.75% if
the restrictive nuclear policies of full exit are also imposed. The
costs of the combined policies are therefore smaller than the sum
of the isolated effects of the carbon budget and the full-exit policy,
which would be 0.78% (indicated by the move of the patch and
the dashed lines, Fig. 6). Hence, the simultaneous imposition of
the two nuclear power policy types implies an escalation of costs,
whereas the cost increase dampens if the climate policy is added.
SI Appendix, Fig. S8, contains a more detailed analysis of the
policy costs. SI Appendix, Figs. S10 and S11, shows an analysis of
the changes from relaxing the carbon budget.
The reason for this dampening is that climate policies have
a dominant effect on fossil fuel markets. The impact of nuclear
power plant decommissioning has to be related to the impact of
climate policies on the markets for fossil fuels and carbon emis-
sion permits. The price of natural gas is decreased by the climate
policy because demand is reduced (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). The
additional gas demand from the decommissioning of nuclear
power is therefore compensated by cheaper natural gas than in
the case without climate policy. The negative effect from the in-
creasing demand for emission permits does not overcompensate
the natural gas market effect as a result of the intertemporal
reallocation of the emission pathway. Hence, the economic costs
of nuclear power plant decommissioning are not further escalated
if it is combined with climate policies.
Conclusion
We present an assessment of the economics of nuclear and cli-
mate policies including decommissioning of existing nuclear
power plants. Our analysis indicates that the economic and en-
ergy-related impacts of strong climate policies are more signifi-
cant than the impact of restrictive nuclear power policies, both in
the short term and in the longer term. The need to reduce
emissions interferes with fossil energy markets and leads to sig-
nificant reductions in the use of coal, oil, and gas. Additional
nuclear power is of only moderate importance for achieving
strong emission reductions.
Restricting new investments in nuclear power mainly has
impacts in the medium term. Decommissioning existing nuclear
power capacities induces a shortfall of electricity production that is
partially compensated by natural gas power. The new-start sce-
narios suggest that new nuclear power capacity can also be
an important means to fill the remaining power production gap. If
this alternative is also abandoned, coal—in the absence of a carbon
budget—or a broad mix of other alternatives is applied if a carbon
budget is in place. Renewable energy seems not to be a prominent
solution approach to fill the shortfall if nuclear power plants
are decommissioned. In all scenarios with decommissioning,
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Fig. 5. The impact of decommissioning nuclear power plants on energy
related CO2 emissions. The graph shows the impact of complete decom-
missioning over time by depicting the differences vs. the case without
decommissioning for four scenarios.
Fig. 6. Policy costs of nuclear power and climate policy scenarios. The graph
depicts cumulative discounted policy costs from 2010 to 2020 compared with
the reference scenario without additional policies in relative terms, applying
a 5% discount rate. The dashed arrow moving the patch for the scenario
with full exit and without climate policy is added to the graph to illustrate
the analysis of policy synergies that is explained in the text.
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approximately one third of the total shortfall is met by demand
reductions.
The economic impact of combining climate and nuclear power
policies reveals the interdependency of the policy dimensions.
Combining restrictive policies regarding new and existing nuclear
power capacities leads to an escalation of negative economic
impacts. However, this escalation is not reinforced if strong cli-
mate policies are also added. The economic impact of imposing
a stringent carbon budget on the economy is the first-order ef-
fect, and much larger than restrictive nuclear power policies. The
reduced gas demand makes it easier to deal with restrictions on
nuclear power deployment.
One important feature of the carbon budget is that it allows for
flexible exhaustion over time. Restrictive nuclear power policies in
the presence of the carbon budget can be alleviated by allowing for
higher emissions from natural gas in the near term that are suf-
ficient to fill a significant share of the supply shortfall from early
retirement. The total amount of reallocation is, however, relatively
small compared with the total carbon budget. Unfortunately, such
policies are difficult to implement because they need to cover
commitments over several decades. Policies that negotiate only
short-term caps on carbon emissions are subject to miss the flex-
ibility because there is no built-in mechanism that guarantees the
consistency with the cumulative long-term emission target.
Another important point is the flexibility of natural gas markets.
The present study assumes, for all scenarios, globally integrated gas
markets. Current natural gas markets are, however, subject to
a range of regulations, which put effective barriers on such flexible
reactions. The prominence of natural gas in cases without climate
policies and in cases with restrictive nuclear power policies indicates
that a transformation toward integrated natural gas markets is
a robust policy strategy. Also, the regional resolution is quite coarse.
France, for instance, is part of the EU27 region. The high French
nuclear share and limited European electricity market integration
impose additional barriers that limit the speed and/or increase the
costs of decommissioning existing nuclear power plants.
The flexibility to ramp up natural gas power plants at a large
scale has been proven in the past. For example, the United States
built 122 GW of natural gas power capacity in a 2-y span of 2002
to 2003, which exceeds today’s US nuclear power capacity (105
GW) (25). The US natural gas power capacity is 422 GW, which
was operating at an average of only 26% in the year 2009 (26).
This low utilization rate suggests huge idle capacities to over-
come an electricity supply shortfall. Another issue is that, pres-
ently, large amounts of gas associated with crude oil production
are flared. For example, Russia flares associated petroleum gas
[168–315 TWh (26, 27)] that could be used to replace a large part
of their nuclear power generation [164 TWh in 2009 (26)]. To
realize the flexibilities of markets and investments, clear policy
signals are needed regarding climate mitigation, nuclear power,
and the global integration of natural gas markets. The major
caveat of the analysis presented here is that imperfections in the
different markets and uncertain expectations by market partic-
ipants regarding future policies are not analyzed. This critique,
however, applies to the reference scenario as well, as full in-
tegration of fossil fuel markets is assumed. Improved analysis in
the future will combine uncertainties about fossil fuel markets
with uncertainties regarding policy signals.
Methodology
In this study, we use the long-term global multiregional model
ReMIND-R (28, 29), an intertemporal general equilibrium
model that hard-links a top-down macroeconomic growth model
with a bottom-up energy system model (30). The model finds
an intertemporal and international equilibrium solution for all
markets (including capital, energy resource, and CO2 permit
markets) under perfect foresight until 2100 by applying the op-
timization-based Negishi approach. Energy conversion technol-
ogies are represented at the capacity level to account for inertia
and path dependency. Acceleration of capacity buildup and re-
source extraction is subject to adjustment costs, thus reflecting
the inertia increasing the scale, and to changing structural com-
position of the energy sector. Fluctuating renewables are subject
to increasing integration costs as their generation share increa-
ses. Nuclear power and climate policies are implemented by
setting restrictions and creation of new markets like those for
CO2 emission permits. More information about the model setup
and parameterization is provided in the SI Appendix.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. This work was supported by German Bundesminis-
terium für Bildung und Forschung program Economics of Climate Change
(N.B.) and the German Fulbright Foundation (R.J.B.).
1. Ahearne JF (2011) Prospects for nuclear power. Energy Econ 33:572–580.
2. Ansolabehere SD, et al. (2003) The Future of Nuclear Power (MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA).
3. Toth FL, Rogner HH (2006) Oil and nuclear: Past, present and future. Energy Econ 28:
1–25.
4. van der Zwaan BCC (2008) Prospects for nuclear energy in Europe. International J
Energy Issues 30:102–121.
5. Nuclear Energy Agency (2010) Uranium 2009. Resources, Production, and Demand
(Nuclear Energy Agency and Organization of Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, Paris).
6. International Energy Agency (2010) IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA, Paris).
7. Energy Information Administration (2009) International Energy Outlook 2009. (EIA,
Washington, DC).
8. Clarke L, et al. (2009) International climate policy architectures: Overview of the EMF
22 International Scenarios. Energy Econ 31:S64–S81.
9. Edenhofer O, et al. (2009) The Economics of Decarbonization. Report of the Recipe
Project (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany).
10. Edenhofer O, et al. (2010) The economics of low stabilization: Model comparison of
mitigation strategies and costs. Energy J 31:11–48.
11. Remme U, Blesl M (2008) A global perspective to achieve low-carbon society (LCS):
Scenario analysis with ETSAP-TIAM. Clim Policy 8(suppl):S60–S75.
12. Vaillancourt K, Labriet M, Loulou R, Waaub JP (2009) The role of nuclear energy in
long-term climate scenarios: An analysis with the World-TIMES model. Energy Policy
36:2296–2307.
13. International Energy Agency (2011) Clean Energy Progress Report. IEA Input to the
Clean Energy Ministerial (IEA, Paris).
14. Meinshausen M, et al. (2009) Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global
warming to 2 °C. Nature 458:1158–1162.
15. WBGU: German Advisory Council on Global Change (2009) Solving the Climate Di-
lemma: The Budget Approach (Springer, Berlin).
16. International Energy Agency (2010) Costs of Electricity (IEA, Paris).
17. Committee on America’s Energy Future (2009) America’s Energy Future: Technology
and Transformation (National Academy Press, Washington, DC).
18. Koomey J, Hultman NE (2007) A reactor-level analysis of busbar costs of US nuclear
plants. Energy Policy 35:5630–5642.
19. Grubler A (2010) The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning
by doing. Energy Policy 38:5274–5288.
20. Lako P, van Heek A, Rothwell G (2010) Nuclear Power. Technological Learning in the
Energy Sector, eds Junginger M, van Sark W, Faaij A (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK),
pp 176–192.
21. Schlesinger M, Lindenberger D, Lutz C (2010) Energieszenarien fr ein Energiekonzept
der Bundesregierung. Project Number 12/10 (German Federal Ministry of Economics
and Technology, Berlin).
22. World Energy Council (2010) 2010 Survey of Energy Resources (World Energy Council,
London).
23. Bundesanstalt fr Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2010) Reserven, Ressourcen und
Verfgbarkeit von Energierohstoffen (Bundesanstalt fr Geowissenschaften und Roh-
stoffe, Hannover, Germany).
24. Bunn M, Holdren JP, Fetter S, van der Zwaan BCC (2005) The economics of re-
processing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Nucl Technol 150:209–230.
25. International Energy Agency (2007) Electricity Information 2007 (IEA, Paris).
26. PFC Energy (2007) Using Russia’s Associated Gas. Prepared for the “Global Gas Flaring
Reduction Partnership” and World Bank. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTGGFR/Resources/pfc_energy_report.pdf. Accessed December 7, 2011.
27. International Energy Agency (2011) IEA World Energy Outlook 2011 (IEA, Paris).
28. Leimbach M, Bauer N, Baumstark L, Edenhofer O (2010) Mitigation costs in a global-
ized world: Climate policy analysis with ReMIND-R. Environ Model Assess 15:155–173.
29. Leimbach M, Bauer N, Baumstark L, Lueken M, Edenhofer O (2010) International
trade and technological change-insights from REMIND-R. The Energy Journal Special
Issue. Econ Low Stabilization 31:161–188.
30. Bauer N, Edenhofer O, Kypreos S (2008) Linking energy system and macroeconomic
growth models. J Comput Manag Sci 5:95–117.
16810 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1201264109 Bauer et al.
